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Previous studies of intergenerational income mobility have not considered potential birth-
order or family-size effects in the estimated income elasticity. This paper uses a large sample
of individuals born between 1962 and 1964; income elasticities with respect to the father’s
income are estimated for individuals in different birth-order positions for a given family size.
This paper presents results based on labor income and total income for sons and daughters
separately. The elasticity tends to decrease with birth order for a given family size, especially
in the labor-income analysis of fathers and sons. Family size, on the other hand, does not
seem to have a large impact on the intergenerational income elasticity.
JEL classification: J62, J12.
Key words: Birth order, family size, intergenerational mobility.
* The author thanks Anders Björklund, Mikael Lindahl, Laura Nelson Chadwick, Håkan Regnér, Peter
Skogman Thoursie, Marianne Sundström, seminar participants at the Swedish Institute for Social Research,
participants at IZA summer school in Labor Economics 2002, and the ESPE conference in Bilbao 2002 for
helpful comments. Financial support from the Wallander and Hedelius foundation, NOS-S and the Swedish Council for
Working Life and Social Research is gratefully acknowledged.2
1. Introduction
Rising interest in intergenerational income mobility has generated many studies of the
relation between the long-run income of parents and children.
1 The interest in the
transmission of economic status from one generation to another is generally motivated by a
wish to determine the degree of equality of opportunity. The extensive Swedish welfare
system is usually interpreted as a decision to promote equal opportunities: for instance, most
schools are public and higher education is free of charge to reduce the importance of family
background. In this way, studies that examine the intergenerational income mobility can be
useful as equality barometers in society.
The empirical studies in this area have not yet considered potential birth-order or family-
size effects in the income relation of parents and children. Children’s similarities to their
parents and their tendencies to approach a similar income level may, to some degree, depend
on whether or not they are the only child in the household. The presence of several siblings
reduces the time that the parents are able to devote to each child. The unique position in the
birth order of each child may also have an impact on this process. For example, first-born
children grow up in more adult-oriented environments than later-born children. Earlier
studies of intergenerational income mobility only provide average income elasticities over
individuals from all categories of birth-order positions and family sizes. The focus in this
study is to find out whether or not income elasticities for individuals with different birth-
order positions and family sizes deviate from the average income elasticity. More specifically,
the first part of the analysis provides conventionally estimated average income elasticities
with respect to the father’s income for both sons and daughters. The second part of the
analysis allows for birth-order and family-size differences in the estimated elasticities.
Potential differences are evaluated at the end. Throughout the paper, family size refers to the
number of full siblings in the family.
The average income elasticity in Sweden for fathers and sons is estimated to be 0.28
(Björklund and Jäntti 1997), 0.24 (Björklund and Chadwick 2002), and 0.13 (Österberg
2000). It is about 0.10 for fathers and daughters (Österberg 2000). In the US, the elasticity
for fathers and sons is about 0.40, while the estimates for fathers and daughters are about
the same (Solon 1992, Zimmerman 1992, Chadwick and Solon 2002). Still, there is little
                                                          
1 See Solon (1999) for a recent survey.3
knowledge about what drives the intergenerational transmission of income. For instance, to
the extent that a parent’s income has an impact on the future income of the children, is the
impact equivalent for all children in a household? Allowing for birth-order and family-size
differences is one way to learn more about the mechanisms behind the transmission of
economic status between generations.
The next section discusses why to expect birth-order and family-size effects in an
intergenerational context; section 3 provides a short overview of the existing literature on
birth-order and family-size effects on the level of earnings and educational attainment.
Section 4 presents the econometric framework for estimating average income elasticities and
income elasticities by birth order and family size. Section 5 describes the data and the sample
selection, section 6 presents the empirical results and section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Why to expect birth-order and family-size effects
Earlier research offers several suggestions why birth order may affect an individual’s future
outcome. Ejrnaes and Pörtner (2002) divide them in four categories: constraints, household-
environment, cultural and biological factors. Most of these categories are also relevant for
the discussion of family size.
Financial constraints and imperfect capital markets may reduce opportunities to equalize
expenditures on children and therefore opportunities for children may vary, depending on
the birth-order position. Further, when the first child is born, many parents are at the start of
their careers, while later-born children may arrive when the parents are closer to the peak of
their careers and earnings profile, especially if there are several children in the household
(Behrman and Taubman 1986). This may favor later-born children compared with earlier-
born children, even though the impact on intergenerational income elasticity for siblings of
different birth order is unclear.
From a constraints perspective, it may be that high-income earners have fewer children
on average and more resources to spend on each child, compared to low-income earners.
Studies have shown that the highest income elasticities between generations are estimated at4
the top of the parents’ income distribution in Sweden (Österberg 2000). This would predict a
negative relation between the number of siblings and income elasticity.
2
The household-environment explanation suggests that the specific number of siblings
and  ages of siblings affect the environment in which the children grow up. Initially, first-
born children spend more time alone with their parents, because there are no other siblings
with whom to compete for parents’ attention. It has been argued that last-born children may
also have this advantage (Hanushek 1992). This is a reasonable argument if there is a large
age difference between the second-to-last and the last-born child.
Parental separation is another aspect connected to the household-environment
explanation. Separation from the father—which is still the most common outcome—may
decrease the father’s influence on the children. Because of this, lower income elasticity
between children and absent fathers may be expected. Beyond this general effect, separations
may also generate birth-order differences in the income elasticity, especially if there are large
age differences between the siblings. Later-born siblings are younger at the time of the
separation, so they have a shorter experience of living in the same household as their father,
compared with older siblings. Therefore, a weaker income relation between the father and
the later-born siblings may be expected. This will be referred to as a separation hypothesis.
Sulloway (1997), a leading debater about the significance of birth order, argues that first-
born children are more likely to identify with authority than their younger siblings. Clausen
(1966) discusses the tendency of parents to delegate parts of their authority over younger
children to the first-born child. He suggests that first-born children tend to recognize and
accept parental authority more than later-born children. It has also been argued that since
first-born children grow up in an adult-oriented environment, they tend to imitate their
parents more than their younger siblings (Behrman and Taubman 1986).
3 A related
discussion concerns role models and the idea that younger siblings might consider older
siblings as role models and identify with them, which reduces the relative influence from the
parents.
Differences in the family environment that depend on family size may occur because
parents with several children have less time to devote to each child. The observation that
economic and social family resources become diluted as the family grows is described as a
                                                          
2 However, such a finding would, at least to some degree, depend on the model being incorrectly specified and
including a quadratic income term may yield a different result.5
trade-off between “child quantity and child quality” (Blake, 1981; 1989). Hanushek (1992)
develops a family maximization model based on a theory presented by Becker (1960) and
Becker and Lewis (1973). It distinguishes between public time, which the family spends
together, and private time, which a child spends alone with one or two parents. Naturally, the
amount of public time does not necessarily decrease with the number of children in the
family, unless the parents must work more to support a larger family, while the amount of
private time is likely to do so. One hypothesis is that there is less parental influence on
children in large families, which may generate weaker income relations. The intergenerational
income elasticity would then again be expected to decrease with family size; accordingly,
children without siblings would be expected to exhibit the largest income elasticity.
Finally, birth-order effects may also be due to cultural factors. For example, there is an
old tradition that the eldest son inherits the farm. This agricultural habit is also common
when private companies are inherited within a family. If this tradition still exists, it may be
reasonable to predict higher income elasticity among first-born children.
3. Previous research on birth-order and family-size effects
Previous studies of birth order and family size have exclusively focused on the effects on
wage level, education level, and schooling performance. Lindert (1977) finds a negative
relation in US data between family size and the expected years of schooling. He also finds
significant sibling position effects on schooling performance. The results indicate that in
large families, first-born children have an advantage over middle-born children. Using
US  data, Behrman and Taubman (1986) find negative effects of family size on years of
schooling. They also find differences by birth order in the effects on years of schooling.
First-born children receive more schooling, and the effects remain when controlling for
family size. The birth-order differences on the effect on earnings, on the other hand, become
insignificant when controlling for family size. Kessler (1991) finds neither significant birth-
order nor childhood family-size effects on the level or growth of wages in US data.
Hanushek (1992) finds positive effects on schooling performance in US data by being the
                                                                                                                                                                            
3 Behrman and Taubman (1986) point out that these kinds of arguments date back to Galton (1874).6
first-born, but this effect is found to be entirely explained by the first-born’s higher
probability of belonging to small families. The study confirms earlier findings that schooling
achievement decreases with a larger family size. Björklund and Jäntti (1998) find that
children from large families in Sweden, Finland, and the US can expect to earn less than
children from small families. Finally, Raaum and Aabo (2001) find that first-born children
obtain more education than their siblings. Overall, these findings indicate the importance of
integrating the birth-order analysis with the family-size analysis to avoid confounding birth-
order effects with family-size effects.
4. Empirical framework
4.1 Estimating intergenerational income elasticity
A traditional model of the relation between the income of parents and children is shown in
equation 1:
where Yci is the long-run log income of child c in family i, Ypi is the long-run log income of
parent p in family i, and εi is a random component distributed as N(0,σ 2 ). β  measures the
elasticity of the childrens’ income with respect to the parents’ income. Consequently, (1-β )
refers to the degree of income mobility. If the childrens’ income has the same variance as the
parents’ income, β  also equals the intergenerational correlation. If the variances differ,
correlations can be obtained by multiplying the elasticity coefficient by the ratio of the
standard deviations of the parents’ and the childrens’ incomes.
The income measure of the model in equation 1—the long-run income—is not observed
in the data. To approach the model in equation 1, income averages taken over several years
are used because they produce a better measure of long-run income than single-year
measures of income (Solon 1992). A parent’s income is usually measured later in the life
cycle compared to the children, therefore intergenerational income mobility studies usually
include age controls in the regressions to adjust for the life-cycle variation in income of both
generations. In the present study, children are of similar age and therefore the age variables
() 1 YY ci pi i =+ + αβ ε7
for children are not included. Furthermore, parents are represented by the fathers in this
study. Least squares is applied to the regression:
where  Yci is the children’s log income in 1999 and Ypi is the three-year average of the
father’s log incomes for 1970, 1975 and 1980.  Api is the father’s average age during the
income years and  A ci 2  is the average of the father’s squared age during those years.
4.2 Allowing for birth-order and family-size effects
A previous finding is that the intergenerational income elasticity tends to rise with the
average age of the children in the sample (Reville 1995). There is then an obvious risk in this
type of analysis that age effects are mistaken for birth-order effects. One solution is to use
individuals of similar age but who still have different birth-order positions and belong to
families of different sizes.
To allow for birth-order and family-size effects, individuals of similar age are divided
into sub-samples, depending on birth-order position and family size. Separate regressions are
then run based on these samples: children without siblings; first-born children in two-child
families; second-born children in two-child families; and so forth. In this way, the
individual’s birth order and family size can affect the estimation of intergenerational income
elasticity.
5. Data and sample selection
The data used in this study are entirely based on administrative records kept by Statistics
Sweden. They consist of a random sample that covers 20% of the population born in
Sweden between 1962 and 1973, which amounts to about 250,000 individuals. In the data,
full siblings, half siblings, and adopted children can be identified, but only full siblings are
included in the analysis. Income data are gathered from registers based on employers’
compulsory reports to the tax authorities and include the years 1990, 1993, 1996, and 1999.
Some information about the individuals’ parents, such as birth date and income, are
() , 2 01 2 3 2 YY A A ci fi fi fi i =+ + + + ββ β β ε8
collected from the 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, and 1990 censuses. The income variables are
annual labor income—including sickness benefits, parents’ allowances, and income from
farming activity—and total income, which includes annual labor income, pensions,
unemployment benefits, capital income (including capital gains), and income from real estate
property (inkomst av annan fastighet).
4
A few restrictions are imposed on the samples used in estimation. The analysis is based
on children who are born between 1962 and 1964. An age restriction on the fathers is also
applied, including those born in 1920 and later. The fathers are also required to be alive in
1980. As a baseline income restriction, the children are required to have a positive income in
1999, while fathers are required to have a positive average income over the income years
(1970, 1975, and 1980). One could argue that only fathers who have a positive income every
year should be included. There is a trade-off between achieving a good measure of long-run
income—which is promoted by including as many income observations per individual as
possible—and avoiding that the sample is biased toward high-income earners. Including only
those individuals who report positive income in all years produces a better measure of long-
run income. But excluding those who have experienced unemployment would increase the
sample’s average income since more low-income earners become unemployed. This, in turn,
might alter the estimated income elasticity because high-income earners tend to have higher
income elasticity (Österberg 2000). Over-sampling high-income earners might also alter the
analysis of family-size effects because high-income earners tend to have fewer children.
Österberg (2000) presents results using both types of income restrictions. The restriction
that requires a positive income every year produces slightly higher estimates of income
elasticity for fathers and sons. The present study follows Österberg (2000) and uses both
types of income restrictions, but to save some space, the appendix presents the results for
the birth-order and family-size analysis where a positive income is required in every year.
The income restriction that requires positive average income results in 25,072 father and son
pairs and 23,885 father and daughter pairs.
5.
Table 1 presents the averages of labor income for sons with a positive income in 1999.
For the complete sample, the average annual income in 1999 is SEK  256,000 (about
                                                          
4 Total income in 1970 is the net of deductions while total income in 1975 and 1980 is not. The difference,
however, is expected to be small.
5 Previous studies have shown large differences in the income elasticity of sons and daughters. So the analysis
should be made separately for sons and daughters.9
EUR 24,000 ). Income averages, according to birth order and family size, indicate that the
average income decreases with family size, and for a given family size it also decreases with
birth order. The same pattern occurs for total income (see the appendix, which also includes
income averages for daughters). Table 2 shows sample characteristics for fathers. In 1975,
the average age of the fathers is 42, and their average annual income is SEK 232,000 which
is slightly lower than the sons’ average income.
6. Empirical results
6.1 Average elasticities
Table 3 presents estimates of average intergenerational income elasticities. The dependent
variable is the sons’/daughters’ log income in 1999. The fathers’ income is a three-year
average of log income. The regressions also include a constant and the fathers’ age and age
squared. For fathers and sons, an income elasticity of 0.277 is estimated in the regression
based on labor income where a positive income is required for at least one year. This
estimate is similar to those found in Björklund and Jäntti (1997) and Björklund and
Chadwick (2002) but higher than the 0.13 estimate in Österberg (2000).
7 Perhaps the
different result to some extent is explained by the older sample in Österberg (2000), where
the individuals are born between 1941 and 1965, while the individuals in this study and the
study by Björklund and Chadwick are born after 1960. Another possible reason is that
Österberg includes non-biological fathers in the sample, which might reduce the elasticity.
Still, this difference needs further explanation.
The requirement of positive income in all years for the fathers produces a larger estimate
for labor income and total income, which is also the finding in Österberg (2000). Further, it
is shown that the intergenerational income elasticity is stronger for labor income than for
total income. For fathers and daughters, an income elasticity of 0.208 is estimated in the
regression based on labor income where positive income is required for at least one year.
This estimate is considerably higher than in Österberg’s study where the comparable
                                                          
7 The measure of parental income in Björklund and Jäntti (1997) is a prediction of the fathers’ log annual
earnings based on his education and occupation.10
estimate is .076. As in the case of fathers and sons, the income relation is stronger for labor
income than for total income.
6.2 Elasticities by birth order and family size
Table 4 presents regression coefficients from estimations of the intergenerational income
elasticity by birth order and family size for both fathers and sons and fathers and daughters.
Column one and row one show the estimate for sons/daughters without siblings; column
one and row two show the estimate for first-born sons/daughters in two-child families; and
so forth.
8 The overall tendency in the analysis of fathers and sons is that the elasticity
decreases with birth order for a given family size, especially in large families. In three-child
families, the estimate for first-born sons deviates largely from the estimates for middle-born
and last-born sons: the former estimate is more than twice as large as the latter. The far-right
column provides estimates for different family sizes regardless of birth order. The results
indicate no large differences in the elasticity connected with family size. The estimates for
fathers and daughters show a similar but weaker elasticity pattern compared to the analysis
of fathers and sons. The finding that the elasticity does not vary much depending on family
size also holds for fathers and daughters.
To test whether or not the estimates are significantly different from each other, the data
are pooled and regressions, where birth-order and family-size variables are interacted with
the fathers’ income, are run. In the analysis of fathers and sons, the estimates are
significantly different from each other in two- and three-child families, while the estimates in
four-child families are not significantly different from each other. In the analysis of fathers
and daughters, the estimates are only significantly different from each other in three-child
families. In both analyses, the estimates for family size that disregard the effect of birth order
are not significantly different from each other.
Regressions are also run where the fathers are required to have had a positive labor
income in all income years. Table A4 in the appendix shows these results. The estimates are
slightly higher compared to the estimates in table 4, and the difference in elasticity between
first-borns and last-borns is about the same.
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Table 5 presents results based on total income for fathers and sons and fathers and
daughters. Because total income also includes unemployment benefits, individuals who have
experienced unemployment are included in this analysis.
9 The results show that the elasticity
decreases with birth order for a given family size, but the decrease is smaller compared to the
labor-income analysis. For sons of four-child families, the birth-order pattern has completely
disappeared. For fathers and daughters, there is no pattern in the elasticity for individuals in
different birth-order positions.
To summarize, a traditional analysis that measures the average elasticity of labor income
(table 3), shows an elasticity of 0.29 for fathers and sons and 0.21 for fathers and daughters.
Allowing for family-size effects does not greatly alter these results, but allowing for birth-
order effects within each family size leads to estimates that decrease with birth order,
especially in the labor income analysis. For fathers and sons, the estimates of first-born
children are twice the size of those for last-born children in large families, and these
estimates are significantly different from each other. The results for fathers and daughters
are similar but weaker.
As mentioned in section 4.2, the intergenerational income elasticity tends to rise with the
average age of the children in the sample. Thus it is not impossible that the elasticity varies
with the age of the fathers, too. In the birth-order and family sixe analysis, the father’s age
varies depending on the child’s birth-order position because fathers of children with high
birth order are, on average, older than fathers of first-born children. To find out if the results
are sensitive to the age of the fathers, regressions are run based on samples excluding both
the youngest and oldest fathers. The results are not sensitive to the exclusion of fathers who
were age 50 or older in 1975, or the fathers who were age 35 or younger in 1975. A related
problem might occur if the size of the standard deviations of the income variable differs
between the two generations. Tables 1 and 2 show that the standard deviation of the income
variable for sons is larger than for fathers. The income variable of the fathers is averaged
over three years, which generally reduces the standard deviation.
10 To check if the results are
sensitive to varying standard deviations, the intergenerational correlation is estimated based
                                                          
9 In the labor-income analysis, fathers who have experienced unemployment are included as long as a positive
income is reported for at least one of the income years.
10 The standard deviation of the fathers’ income in 1970, 1975, and 1980 is around 130,000, while the standard
deviation of the average income over those years is 116,000.12
on standardized income data.
11 The results show that the correlation decreases with birth
order for a given family size and the differences are significantly different from each other, in
the same way as in the elasticity analysis. So the results are not sensitive to varying standard
deviations. The results based on correlations are available upon request.
6.3 Testing hypotheses about the birth-order pattern
This section tries to understand why income elasticity tends to decrease with birth order for
a given family size. The data allow some of the hypotheses discussed in section 2 to be
tested. The separation hypothesis suggests that the tendency of income elasticity to decrease
with birth order may be explained by the incidence of parental separations, because they are
likely to affect the later-born children the most. In the case where the children are separated
from the father, a weaker income relation between the father and the later-born children
may be expected. Björklund and Chadwick (2002) analyze income elasticities in both intact
and separated families. They find that sons who always lived with their biological fathers
have a labor income elasticity of 0.25. Sons who sometimes lived with their biological fathers
have an elasticity of 0.20-0.23, while sons who never lived with their biological fathers have a
very low elasticity not significantly different from zero. To test the separation hypothesis, an
analysis is made exclusively on children who lived with their fathers in 1970 and 1975, when
they were ages 6-8 and 11-13, respectively. If the income elasticity would not decrease with
birth order in the analysis that only includes individuals from intact families, this would be in
line with a separation hypothesis. Table 6 presents the results for sons and daughters who
lived with their fathers in 1970 and 1975 and where the fathers’ labor income is required to
be positive for at least one of the income years. The elasticity of sons without siblings, is
larger compared with the estimate in table 4, where the separated families were included.
Thus there is a stronger income relation in one-child families between fathers and sons who
have lived together during the son’s upbringing. In families with more than one child, this
effect is not present. For sons in two-child families, there is no change in the elasticity for
first-borns compared to the results in table 4, while the elasticity is smaller for last-borns.
The estimates for sons in three-child families show that first-borns have larger elasticity than
before, while the elasticity of middle-born children is unchanged. The elasticity of last-born
children has increased compared to the results in table 4; this result is weakly in line with the
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assumptions of a separation hypothesis. In families with four or more children, the elasticity
of last-born children is unchanged.
In the analysis of fathers and daughters, it is shown that daughters without siblings, who
have grown up with their fathers, have a stronger income relation to their fathers. As in the
analysis of fathers and sons, this effect is not present in families with more than one child.
The rest of the elasticities are more or less unchanged. To summarize, the results for sons
from three-child families are weakly in line with a separation hypothesis, while the results for
sons from other family sizes and for fathers and daughters are not. Therefore it is impossible
to draw strong conclusions about a separation hypothesis.
Cultural factors suggest potential reasons why birth order would affect an individual’s
future outcome, for example, the old tradition that the eldest son inherits the farm or the
family company. To the extent that this tradition continues, one may expect higher income
elasticity among first-born children.
12 The results in this paper are to some extent in line with
this prediction. Table 4 shows that the estimate for first-born sons from three-child families
is much larger than the estimates for middle-born and last-born sons. One way to approach
this problem is to find out if there is an abundance of first-born children among the self-
employed. Table 7 shows the fraction of self-employed children in different birth-order and
family-size categories: there is no abundance of self-employed among first-born sons or
daughters. Rather, the small differences indicate the opposite pattern. So the results are not
in line with this hypothesis.
7. Conclusion
The main finding of this paper is that there seems to be patterns in the transmission of
economic status between fathers and children. The income elasticity tends to decrease with
birth order for a given family size, especially in the labor-income analysis of fathers and sons.
The present paper estimates an average 0.28 labor-income elasticity of fathers and sons. An
analysis that allows for birth-order and family-size variation in the elasticity finds that the
elasticity is up to 14 percentage points higher than the average elasticity for first-born
children, and up to 12 percentage points lower than the average for last-born children in
                                                          
12 There may, however, be problems when measuring income of farmers and the self-employed. For example,
self-employed people may not report income as wages.14
large families. Although family size does not seem to have a large impact on the
intergenerational income elasticity.
The results on birth order are partly in line with one of the predicted birth-order effects
that is suggested in section 2. The separation hypothesis predicts a weaker income relation
between an absent father and later-born children; the results for sons from three-child
families are weakly in line with this hypothesis. The results for sons from other family sizes
and for fathers and daughters are not in line with a separation hypothesis.
There still remain birth-order differences in the results that need to be accounted for.
Perhaps psychological factors lead to these differences, such as the hypothesis that younger
children regard older siblings as role models and are influenced by them rather than their
fathers. This may generate weaker income relations between fathers and later-born children
compared to first-borns or an only child.
Future research might investigate if the results in the paper can be replicated with other
data sets and identify central mechanisms behind the dynamic process of income
transmission between different family members.15
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Table 1. Annual labor income of sons in 1999 (SEK 1000s)
St.  
Variable Mean dev. Min. Max N
Pooled sample 256  182  0  13,134  25,073
Income by birth order and family size:
Sons without siblings 256   135  0 965     1,561
Sons from two-child families  264  198 0 13,134  11,334
1
st 269   172  0 3,724    6,106
2
nd 258  225  0 13,134    5,228
Sons from three-child families 257 181 0 8,180    7,803
1
st 263  205 0 8,180   2,742
2
nd 258  190  0 6,822   2,720
3
rd 250  133 0 2,097   2,341
Sons from four- or more child families 236  152 0 5,333   4,375
1
st 252  233  0 5,333      769
2
nd 234  151 0 2,912       848
3
rd 235  120 0 1,047    1,062
4
th 229  121 0 1,492    1,696
Note: The individuals in the samples are required to have positive income in 1999. The minimum value of 0 in
the table indicates an income below SEK 500 and these values were rounded down to 0 (the income data are
expressed in SEK 1000s). The share of an only child is smaller than the share in the Swedish population. This is
due to the sampling procedure used by Statistics Sweden, which makes random draws based on individuals
rather than households, leading to the over-representation of large families.18
Table 2. Sample characteristics of fathers
Variable St.
Mean dev. Min. Max N
Pooled sample:
Labor income (SEK 1000s) 232 116     1   2,089 25,073
Age in 1975 41.7 5.9 26.0     55.0 25,073
Labor income by number of children:
Fathers of one child 217   87      1      981   1,561
Fathers of two children 235 106    1   1,652 11,334
Fathers of three children 239 125    1   2,089   7,803
Fathers of four or more children  220 132     1   1,703   4,375
Age in 1975 by number of children:
Fathers of one child 42.3  6.3 29.0    55.0 1,561
Fathers of two children 41.0  5.6 28.0    55.0 11,334
Fathers of three children 41.6  5.8 28.0    55.0   7,803
Fathers of four or more children  43.6  6.1 26.0    55.0   4,375
Age in 1975 by birth-order position of child:
Fathers of first-born children  39.0 5.3 26.0 55.0 11,178
Fathers of children who are no. 2  42.5 5.1 30.0 55.0   8,796
Fathers of children who are no. 3  45.4 5.0 30.0 55.0   3,403
Fathers of children who are no. 4+ 47.8 4.6 33.0 55.0   1,696
Note: Income measure: average annual income during the years 1970, 1975, and 1980. ‘Children who are no.
4+’ refers to children who have birth-order position 4 or higher.19
Table 3. Estimated average intergenerational income elasticities
Variable  Labor income  Total income
Fathers and sons
Positive income for  .277  .268
at least one year (.011) (.010)
25,072 26,157
Positive income for  .300  .285
all years (.012) (.011)
23,534 24,883
Fathers and daughters
Positive income for  .208  .160
at least one year (.012) (.010)
23,885 24,987
Positive income for  .235  .169
all years (.014) (.010)
22,337 23,724
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; sample sizes in italics.Table 4. Estimated intergenerational elasticities in labor income for sons and daughters born between 1962 and 1964
No. of children
 in family Birth order
Fathers and sons  Fathers and daughters
1 2 3 4 +  A l l   1234 +   A l l
1     .227    .227   .231  .231
(.048) (.048) (.057)   (.057)
1,560 1,560 1,434  1,434
2     .286   .275    .284  .203  .190    .198
(.014) (.017)  (.026) (.026) (.028)  (.019)
6,105 5,227  11,333 5,891 4,899  10,791
3     .422   .254   .206    .291  .238  .247   .138 .205
(.034) (.032) (.030)  (.019) (.039) (.039) (.034)  (.021)
2,741 2,719 2,340  7,804 2,645 2,464 2,354  7,465
4+     .322   .252   .269   .160    .235   .176  .122   .249    .174 .196
(.061) (.055) (.048) (.037)  (.031) (.063) (.058) (.053)  (.042)  (.026)
   768    847 1,061   1,695   4,375   707   799 1,036  1,647  4,192
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; sample sizes in italics. The measure of income is log labor income (annual wages before taxes, sickness benefits, parental
allowances, and income from farming activity). Income is measured in 1999 for sons and daughters and in 1970, 1975, and 1980 for fathers. A positive income for at
least one year is required for fathers.21
Table 5. Estimated intergenerational elasticities in total income for sons and daughters born between 1962 and 1964
No. of children
 in family Birth order
Fathers and sons  Fathers and daughters
1 2 3 4 +  A l l   1234 +   A l l
1     .372   .372   .180  .180
(.049) (.049) (.046)   (.046)
1,641 1,641 1,510  1,510
2     .277   .247    .265  .125  .178    .150
(.021) (.021)  (.015) (.022) (.022)  (.015)
6,360 5,428  11,789 6,138 5,123  11,262
3     .324   .265   .213    .269  .188  .175   .179 .183
(.031) (.030) (.027)  (.017) (.030) (.028) (.031)  (.017)
2,850 2,826 2,429  8,107 2,767 2,572 2,452  7,793
4+     .268   .184   .255   .215    .227   .175  .131   .132    .084 .124
(.053) (.052) (.038) (.029)  (.020) (.047) (.048) (.044)  (.029)  (.020)
   810    890 1,123   1,791   4,617   745   838 1,086  1,747  4,419
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; sample sizes in italics. The measure of income is log total income (annual labor income, pensions, unemployment benefits, capital
income (including capital gains), and income from real estate property). Income is measured in 1999 for sons and daughters and in 1970, 1975, and 1980 for fathers.22
Table 6. Estimated intergenerational elasticities in labor income of children who shared households with their fathers at least in 1970 and 1975
No. of children
 in family Birth order
Fathers and sons  Fathers and daughters
1 2 3 4 +  A l l   1234 +   A l l
1     .283    .283 .308 .308
(.055) (.055) (.067)   (.067)
1,389 1,389 1,272  1,272
2     .285   .244    .267  .213  .212    .214
(.024) (.027)  (.018) (.029) (.030) (.021)
5,544 4,680  10,225 5,314 4,401   9,716
3     .448   .256   .245    .314  .249  .224 .132 .198
(.037) (.036) (.033)  (.020) (.041) (.041) (.036)  (.022)
2,587 2,520 2,133  7,247 2,471 2,291 2,144  6,908
4+     .268   .219   .282   .168    .221   .184  .130   .247    .176 .200
(.067) (.058) (.050) (.038)  (.025) (.066) (.066) (.054)  (.043)  (.027)
   726    801   984   1,541   4,055   676   744    960  1,492  3,875
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; sample sizes in italics. The measure of income is log labor income (annual wages before taxes, sickness benefits, parental
allowances, and income from farming activity). Income is measured in 1999 for sons and daughters and in 1970, 1975, and 1980 for fathers.23
Table 7 Fraction of self-employed children in different birth-order and family-size categories
No. of children
 in family Birth order
Sons Daughters
1234 +  A l l   1234 +  A l l
1 .056 .056 .031 .031
2 .048 .054 .051 .026 .030 .028
3 .055 .054 .068 .059 .034 .037 .034 .035
4+ .058 .070 .062 .065 .064 .031 .033 .024 .023 .02624
Appendix
Table A1: Annual total income of sons in 1999 (SEK 1000s)
St.
Variable Mean dev. Min. Max. N
Pooled sample 271   254    0  13,693   26,154
Income by birth order and family size:
Sons without siblings 272  209    0    5,215   1,642
Sons from two-child families 277 239   0 13,693 11,790
1
st  282 237   0   6,382    6,361
2
nd 271  240   0 13,693    5,429
Sons from three-child families 275 291   0 11,863    8,108
1
st 279  275   0   8,772   2,851
2
nd 274 279   0   9,983   2,827
3
rd 270  321   0 11,863   2,430
Sons from four- or more families 250 233   0   7,301   4,618
1
st 256 229   1   5,306      811
2
nd 246  191   0   2,912       891
3
rd 248  150   0   2,634   1,124
4
th 251 287   0   7,301     1,792
Note: The individuals in the samples are required to have positive income in 1999. The minimum value of 0 in the table indicates an income below SEK 500 and these
values were rounded down to 0 (the income data are expressed in SEK 1000s). The share of an only child is smaller than the share in the Swedish population. This is
due to the sampling procedure used by Statistics Sweden, which makes random draws based on individuals rather than households, leading to the over-representation
of large families.25
Table A2. Annual labor income of daughters in 1999 (SEK 1000s)
St.
Variable Mean dev. Min. Max N
Pooled sample 168 96 0  2,575 23,886
Income by birth order and family size:
Daughters without siblings 177   102  0     885   1,435
Daughters from two-child families 172 96 0 2,575 10,792
1st 174   96 0 1,217  5,892
2nd 169   97 0 2,575  4,900
Daughters from three-child families 167 100 0 2,113 7,466
1st 169 97 0 1,022 2,646
2nd 169 101 0 1,282 2,465
3rd 164 102 0 2,113 2,355
Daughters from four- or more child families 156 85 0   944  4,193
1st 162 90 0   944 708
2nd 157  80 0   460  800
3rd 155  84 0   531  1 037
4th 153  85 0   819  1,648
Note: The individuals in the samples are required to have positive income in 1999. The minimum value of 0 in the table indicates income below SEK 500 and these
values were rounded down to 0 (the income data are expressed in SEK 1000s). The share of an only child is smaller than the share in the Swedish population. This is
due to the sampling procedure used by Statistics Sweden, which makes random draws based on individuals rather than households, leading to the over-representation
of large families.26
Table A3. Annual total income of daughters in 1999 (SEK 1000s)
St.
Variable Mean dev. Min. Max N
Pooled sample 185 298  0  43,066  24,988
Income by birth order and family size:
Daughters without siblings 189   104  0    1,086    1,511
Daughters from two-child families 188  141 0   7,946  11,263
1st 189   133 0   6,946    6,139
2nd 186  150 0   7,946    5,124
Daughters from three-child families 189  500 0   43,067    7,794
1st 185 130 0   4,820   2,768
2nd 186  105 0   1,714    2,573
3rd 198  873 0 43,066   2,453
Daughters from four- or more child families 172 89 0   2,087   4,420
1st 178 107 0   2,087     746
2nd 170  74 0     657      839
3rd 173  87 0  1,065    1,087
4th 170 89 0  2,046    1,748
Note: The individuals in the samples are required to have positive income in 1999. The minimum value of 0 in the table indicates income below SEK 500 and these
values were rounded down to 0 (the income data are expressed in SEK 1000s). The share of an only child is smaller than the share in the Swedish population. This is
due to the sampling procedure used by Statistics Sweden, which makes random draws based on individuals rather than households, leading to the over-representation
of large families.27
Table A4. Estimated elasticities in labor income with respect to father’s income. Positive income in all income years required.
No. of children
in family Birth-order
Fathers and sons Fathers and daughters
1234  A l l   1234  A l l
1 .293 .293 .286 .286
(.060) (.060) (.066)
(.066)
1 470 1 470 1 360 1
360
2  .333 .288   .314 .217 .234 .227
(.026)  (.029)   (.019) (.030) (.032)
(.022) 5 791 4 951 10 743   5 559 4
649 10  209
3   .413 .299 .237  .314 .295 .249  .158 .233
(.037) (.036) (.035) (.021) (.0243) (.043) (.040)
(.024)
2 579  2 573  2 188  7 342 2 482 2 325  2 186  6
995
4   .239 .370 .174 .197 .232 .160 .098  .271 .211 .212
(.077) (.064) (.053) (.044) (.028) (.078) (.066) (.059) (.053)
(.031)  701   772   980  1 520 3 976  652 735  942 1
438 3 770
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Sample sizes in italics. The measure of income is log labor income (annual wages before taxes, sickness benefit, parental
allowance, income from farming activity). Income is measured in 1999 for sons and daughters and in 1970, 1975 and 1980 for fathers.